A New Form of Moral Luck?

Forthcoming in Agency and Moral Responsibility (Buckareff, Moya, and Rosell, eds.). I discuss a particularly puzzling form of luck: one where our responsibility seems to depend exclusively on whether other responsible agents are present and what their contributions are.

Sensitivity to Reasons and Actual Sequences

Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Shoemaker, ed., 2015). How can one hold that acting freely is a matter of being sensitive to (non-actual) reasons, and also hold that freedom is just a function of actual sequences? I argue for an answer in terms of the concept of absence causation.

Making a Difference in a Deterministic World

The Philosophical Review 122 (2013). I argue that responsibility is grounded in difference-making, in particular, in a form of difference-making that is compatible with determinism.

Causation and Freedom

Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012). I argue that the metaphysics of causation has a neglected but important role to play in the debate about freedom and determinism. In particular, the intransitivity of causation can support a better version of the alternative possibilities view of freedom (as well as a rival view that doesn’t require alternative possibilities).

Resultant Luck

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012). I give an account of the concept of resultant moral luck (moral luck about consequences), a concept that is, I argue, much more intricate and interesting than has been recognized.

Actuality and Responsibility

Mind 120 (2011). “Actual-sequence” views of responsibility are views according to which moral responsibility is a function of actual sequences. I argue that the best view of this kind is one that understands actual sequences in a non-traditional way and one that entails that unactualized possibilities of a certain kind are always relevant to responsibility.

Moore on Doing versus Allowing Harm

Rutgers Law Journal 42 (2011). This is a critical discussion of Michael Moore’s views on the doing/allowing distinction in his book Causation and Responsibility (Oxford, 2009).

Failing to Do the Impossible

In New Waves in the Philosophy of Action (Aguilar, Frankish, and Buckareff, eds., 2010). I discuss the relation between intentional omissions and alternative possibilities.

Causation and Ethics

In Oxford Handbook of Causation (Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies, eds., 2009). I discuss the role of causation in consequentialism, the distinction between killing and letting die, the doctrine of double effect, and the concept of moral responsibility.

Moral Inertia

Philosophical Studies 140 (2008). I argue that, according to commonsense morality, there is moral pressure to leave things “as is.”

Causation and Responsibility

Philosophy Compass (2007). I discuss different views about the relation between moral responsibility and causation and I defend an unorthodox view.

Disjunctive Causes

Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006). I argue that there is reason to believe in the existence of disjunctive causes.

Failures to Act and Failures of Additivity

Philosophical Perspectives 20 (2006). It might seem that, if I cause X and Y, I also cause their sum. I argue that this principle fails, at least for omissions, and I draw some implications of this failure for the problem of famine.

Causes As Difference-Makers

Philosophical Studies 123 (2005). I defend a principle according to which causes are difference-makers with respect to their effects.

How To Be Responsible For Something Without Causing It

Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004). I argue that being morally responsible doesn’t entail being a cause, and I offer an alternative way of understanding the relationship between responsibility and causation.