Forthcoming in Surrounding Free Will (Mele, ed., 2015). I argue that the threat to our free will isn’t determinism but determination by factors beyond our causal reach. I draw consequences for some free will debates.
(with Juan Comesaña) Noûs 48 (2014). We argue for a new difference-making constraint on evidence and justification. We show that the constraint sheds light on the easy knowledge problem.
The Philosophical Review 122 (2013). I argue that responsibility is grounded in difference-making, in particular, in a form of difference-making that is compatible with determinism.
Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012). I argue that the metaphysics of causation has a neglected but important role to play in the debate about freedom and determinism. In particular, the intransitivity of causation can support a better version of the alternative possibilities view of freedom (as well as a rival view that doesn’t require alternative possibilities).
Legal Theory 18 (2012). This is part of a symposium on Michael Moore’s book Causation and Responsibility. I critically examine Moore’s views on whether and how agents are responsible in overdetermination cases and then develop my own view on this issue.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012). I give an account of the concept of resultant moral luck (moral luck about consequences), a concept that is, I argue, much more intricate and interesting than has been recognized.
Mind 120 (2011). “Actual-sequence” views of responsibility are views according to which moral responsibility is a function of actual sequences. I argue that the best view of this kind is one that understands actual sequences in a non-traditional way and one that entails that unactualized possibilities of a certain kind are always relevant to responsibility.
Rutgers Law Journal 42 (2011). This is a critical discussion of Michael Moore’s views on the doing/allowing distinction in his book Causation and Responsibility (Oxford, 2009).
In New Waves in the Philosophy of Action (Aguilar, Frankish, and Buckareff, eds., 2010). I discuss the relation between intentional omissions and alternative possibilities.
In New Waves in Metaphysics (Hazzlett, ed., 2010). I argue that counterfactual views of causation cannot accommodate causation by omission while remaining faithful to the motivation for accepting that kind of causation.
Noûs 43 (2009). I argue that omissions make trouble for causal theories of agency.
In Oxford Handbook of Causation (Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies, eds., 2009). I discuss the role of causation in consequentialism, the distinction between killing and letting die, the doctrine of double effect, and the concept of moral responsibility.
Philosophical Studies 140 (2008). I argue that, according to commonsense morality, there is moral pressure to leave things “as is.”
Philosophy Compass (2007). I discuss different views about the relation between moral responsibility and causation and I defend an unorthodox view.
Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006). I argue that there is reason to believe in the existence of disjunctive causes.
Philosophical Perspectives 20 (2006). It might seem that, if I cause X and Y, I also cause their sum. I argue that this principle fails, at least for omissions, and I draw some implications of this failure for the problem of famine.
Philosophical Studies 129 (2006). I offer conditions under which causing an outcome to happen in a certain way is not sufficient for causing the outcome. The principle works as an argument against the transitivity of causation.
Noûs 39 (2005). I argue that there is a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions, which has its source in a causal asymmetry.
Philosophical Studies 123 (2005). I defend a principle according to which causes are difference-makers with respect to their effects.
Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004). I argue that being morally responsible doesn’t entail being a cause, and I offer an alternative way of understanding the relationship between responsibility and causation.