Forthcoming in Agency and Moral Responsibility (Buckareff, Moya, and Rosell, eds.). I discuss a particularly puzzling form of luck: one where our responsibility seems to depend exclusively on whether other responsible agents are present and what their contributions are.
Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (Shoemaker, ed., 2015). How can one hold that acting freely is a matter of being sensitive to (non-actual) reasons, and also hold that freedom is just a function of actual sequences? I argue for an answer in terms of the concept of absence causation.
Forthcoming in Criminal Law and Philosophy. This is a critical discussion of Vihvelin’s Causes, Laws, and Free Will (OUP, 2013).
In Surrounding Free Will (Mele, ed., 2015). I argue that the threat to our free will isn’t determinism but determination by factors beyond our causal reach. I draw consequences for some free will debates.
(with Juan Comesaña) Noûs 48 (2014). We argue for a new difference-making constraint on evidence and justification. We show that the constraint sheds light on the easy knowledge problem.
The Philosophical Review 122 (2013). I argue that responsibility is grounded in difference-making, in particular, in a form of difference-making that is compatible with determinism.
Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012). I argue that the metaphysics of causation has a neglected but important role to play in the debate about freedom and determinism. In particular, the intransitivity of causation can support a better version of the alternative possibilities view of freedom (as well as a rival view that doesn’t require alternative possibilities).
Legal Theory 18 (2012). This is part of a symposium on Michael Moore’s book Causation and Responsibility. I critically examine Moore’s views on whether and how agents are responsible in overdetermination cases and then develop my own view on this issue.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012). I give an account of the concept of resultant moral luck (moral luck about consequences), a concept that is, I argue, much more intricate and interesting than has been recognized.
Mind 120 (2011). “Actual-sequence” views of responsibility are views according to which moral responsibility is a function of actual sequences. I argue that the best view of this kind is one that understands actual sequences in a non-traditional way and one that entails that unactualized possibilities of a certain kind are always relevant to responsibility.
Rutgers Law Journal 42 (2011). This is a critical discussion of Michael Moore’s views on the doing/allowing distinction in his book Causation and Responsibility (Oxford, 2009).
In New Waves in the Philosophy of Action (Aguilar, Frankish, and Buckareff, eds., 2010). I discuss the relation between intentional omissions and alternative possibilities.
In New Waves in Metaphysics (Hazzlett, ed., 2010). I argue that counterfactual views of causation cannot accommodate causation by omission while remaining faithful to the motivation for accepting that kind of causation.
Noûs 43 (2009). I argue that omissions make trouble for causal theories of agency.
In Oxford Handbook of Causation (Beebee, Hitchcock and Menzies, eds., 2009). I discuss the role of causation in consequentialism, the distinction between killing and letting die, the doctrine of double effect, and the concept of moral responsibility.
Philosophical Studies 140 (2008). I argue that, according to commonsense morality, there is moral pressure to leave things “as is.”
Philosophy Compass (2007). I discuss different views about the relation between moral responsibility and causation and I defend an unorthodox view.
Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006). I argue that there is reason to believe in the existence of disjunctive causes.
Philosophical Perspectives 20 (2006). It might seem that, if I cause X and Y, I also cause their sum. I argue that this principle fails, at least for omissions, and I draw some implications of this failure for the problem of famine.
Philosophical Studies 129 (2006). I offer conditions under which causing an outcome to happen in a certain way is not sufficient for causing the outcome. The principle works as an argument against the transitivity of causation.
Noûs 39 (2005). I argue that there is a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions, which has its source in a causal asymmetry.
Philosophical Studies 123 (2005). I defend a principle according to which causes are difference-makers with respect to their effects.
Philosophical Perspectives 18 (2004). I argue that being morally responsible doesn’t entail being a cause, and I offer an alternative way of understanding the relationship between responsibility and causation.